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Article 5

Causation, Truth, and the Law
Richard Scheines†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Deciding matters of legal liability, in torts and other
civil actions, requires deciding causation. The injury suffered
by a plaintiff must be caused by an event or condition due to
the defendant. The courts distinguish between cause-in-fact
and proximate causation, where cause-in-fact is guided by the
“but-for” test: the effect would not have happened, but for the
cause.1 Proximate causation is a set of legal limitations on
cause-in-fact.
As this conference is entitled A Cross-Disciplinary Look
at Scientific Truth: What’s the Law to Do, I will ignore the
distinction between cause-in-fact and proximate causation, and
instead focus on both the sense in which cause-in-fact claims
can be considered true or false and on the challenges to
establishing them.
Before a court can decide on proximate causation, and
thus on liability or damages, it must decide on the truth of the
cause-in-fact question: Was the injury suffered by the plaintiff
caused by the action(s) or inaction(s) of the defendant? For
example, was John Smith’s liver cancer caused by his exposure
to trichloroethylene (“TCE”) in a factory that employed him for
ten years?
I will focus on what we must assume before cause-infact claims can even be said to have a truth value, that is,
objectively true or false independent of whether we can know
it. Philosophers distinguish individual level causal claims
(cause-in-fact claims) from “general causal claims.”2 I will try to
†
Dr. Scheines is a Professor (and Head) of Philosophy at Carnegie Mellon
University, with courtesy appointments in the Department of Machine Learning and
the Human-Computer Interaction Institute.
1
See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1775
(1985).
2
David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556, 556-57 (1973); see Richard
Scheines, Causation, in 1 THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 280. 280-88
(Maryanne Cline Horowitz, ed. 2005).
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make the difference clear and then discuss the difficulties that
arise in claiming that either have a determinate truth value. I
will argue that if there is a truth to the matter about individual
causal claims, it is parasitic upon the truth of general causal
claims, and that therefore the relevant issues for the law
involve deciding on the truth of general causal claims.
Given the limited amount of relevant empirical scientific evidence that is typically available, however, deciding in a
legal setting whether such claims are actually true or false can
be extremely difficult. As courts have no choice but to decide
such matters, they need a rational process by which to
synthesize the evidence for or against causal claims—both with
respect to our best scientific guess about the truth of the claim
and with respect to the scientific uncertainty about such a
guess.
I will sketch the various forms of evidence that are used
to prove general causal claims and then describe the strategies
and problems associated with synthesizing the totality of this
evidence into a single judgment, both with regard to the truth
of a causal claim and with regard to the uncertainty with
respect to that judgment.
II.

INDIVIDUAL VERSUS GENERAL CAUSATION,
INDETERMINISM, AND TRUTH

A.

Individual Versus General Causal Claims

Consider first the difference between individual and
general level causal claims. In legal contexts, the goal is often
to establish whether one particular event or condition was the
cause of another particular event or condition. For example, if
John Smith contracts liver cancer, a court might seek to
establish whether or not his exposure to TCE in a factory that
employed him for ten years was the “proximate cause” of his
particular cancer. In such cases, by saying that exposure to
TCE caused the disease, courts typically ask whether the
cancer would not have occurred but for the exposure to TCE.3
This is an individual level causal claim, and one whose truth, if

3
See Wright, supra note 1, at 1775; see also Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause:
Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 95861 (2001).
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it has one, depends on a counterfactual claim: what would have
happened to John Smith had he not been exposed to TCE.4
General causal claims refer to a population of individuals, and concern the probability or average severity of a
property (for example, a disease) in that population. For
example, a qualitative general causal claim about TCE and
liver cancer might be: in a population of factory workers who
were exposed to TCE, the probability of getting liver cancer
(the risk among the exposed) is higher than it would have been
in the same population had they not been exposed to TCE. A
quantitative version of the same general causal claim: the risk
of liver cancer among those exposed to TCE was 2%, while the
risk in the same group, had they not been exposed, would have
been 1%. Another example is the following: among middle class
American children between the ages of five and ten, if everyone
had watched one less hour of TV per day, then the average
Body Mass Index (“BMI”)5 of the group would have been .5
point lower than it was.
Clearly, claiming that TCE causes liver cancer in a
population of workers does not entail that every worker who
was exposed to TCE will develop liver cancer, and it does not
entail that every case of liver cancer among the workers would
not have happened but for TCE exposure. Similarly, not all
children would have lost .5 point of BMI had they decreased
their TV watching by one hour per day, etc. Again, the general
causal claims each make a counterfactual claim. In the TCE
and liver cancer case, the claim is: had the same population
lived the same life, with the exception of not being exposed to
TCE, then the probability of liver cancer would have been
lower than it was in the actual world. In the TV and obesity
case, the claim is: had the same population of American
children lived the same life, with the exception that they had
watched an hour less of TV per day, then the average BMI in
the population would have been .5 point lower than it was in
the actual world.

4
David Lewis developed the most influential account of counterfactuals in
philosophy, see DAVID LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS (2001); and Donald Rubin developed
the most influential account of causation based on counterfactuals in Statistics, see
Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and
Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 688 (1974).
5
BMI is calculated as 703 x (weight in pounds) / (height in inches)2.
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General Causal Claims and Truth

Since our target is the law, which for the most part
deals with events that have already occurred, I will restrict my
attention to causal claims about things that have already
happened. For example, was John Smith’s liver cancer caused
by his exposure to TCE, or was the rise in obesity in the late
twentieth century caused by an increase in TV watching?
On this sort of counterfactual account of causation,
consider what it might mean to assert that general causal
claims have a truth value, that is, that they are either true or
false in the actual world. Two objections arise immediately: the
vagueness and objectivity of counterfactual possible worlds,
and the meaning of probability.
That causal claims in the actual world might depend
upon what would or would not happen in alternative possible
worlds bothers almost everyone. The problem is that most
descriptions of alternative possible worlds seem intolerably
vague. For example, in the TV and obesity claim we are asked
to consider a world in which the same children lived the same
life but watched one hour less of TV per day. How exactly do we
imagine the change in their world so that they each watch one
hour less of TV per day? Do we make the TV inoperable one
hour before they would have turned it off anyway? Convince
their parents to intervene and select an hour of TV every day
the child will no longer watch? Offer them just enough of a
candy reward to get them to voluntarily shut down the TV one
hour before they would have anyway? Make them replace the
first hour of TV they would have watched with exercise? The
counterfactual as we stated it is vague—it can’t answer any of
these questions even though they all obviously matter for
assessing the causal claim.
One can, however, fully specify a manipulation or intervention that would change the actual world to the possible
world we are considering in a way that eliminates all this
vagueness. Donald Rubin famously articulated a counterfactual
theory of causation based on drug trials.6 If we consider an
experiment in which some people received a pill containing a
drug (the treatment) and the other half received a pill identical
in appearance, taste, etc. (the control), then the causal
inference problem with respect to the drug amounts to missing
6

See Rubin, supra note 4.
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data from alternative possible worlds. For the people who took
the treatment pill, we are missing the data on what would have
happened to them if they had taken the control pill. For the
people who took the control pill, we are missing the data on
what would have happened to them if they had taken the
treatment pill (Table 1).
Took treatment pill

Took control pill

Jane Doe

Cured

???

Person 2

Ill

???

Person N - 1

???

Ill

Person N

???

Ill

...

Table 1 Missing data needed to assess causal efficacy of treatment.

Since the pills are identical in appearance, etc., surely it
is not difficult to be perfectly precise about the alternative
worlds under discussion. Jane Doe took the treatment pill and
recovered—what would have happened if she had taken the
control pill? It isn’t hard to imagine the antecedent: an
alternative world in which we leave everything as we found it
in the real world, except for removing the drug from the pill
Jane took. Knowing whether or not, in this hypothetical world,
Jane would have remained ill or recovered is not so simple.
The point is this: the problem of vagueness is not
insurmountable. It requires being clear about the intervention
performed to transform the actual world into the counterfactual world.7 In the TCE and liver cancer case, we might
describe a world in which the factory workers behaved
identically, but the de-greasing chemical used in the factory

7

The idea of making counterfactuals clear by formalizing the idea of an
intervention has been developed extensively. See generally JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY:
MODELS, REASONING, AND INFERENCE (2000); PETER SPIRTES ET AL., CAUSATION,
PREDICTION, AND SEARCH (2d ed. 2000); James Robins, A New Approach to Causal
Inference in Mortality Studies with Sustained Exposure Periods—Application to Control
of the Healthy Worker Survivor Effect, 7 MATHEMATICAL MODELLING 1393 (1986)
(errata appears in 14 COMPUTERS & MATHEMATICS WITH APPLICATIONS 917 (1987)).
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in which they worked was changed from TCE to a specific
alternative known to be non-carcinogenic.8
Assuming that vagueness is not an issue, what about
the probability part of general causal claims? Recall that to
assess the TCE and liver cancer claim, we need to know the
probability of liver cancer in the population exposed to TCE
and in the same population not exposed to TCE.
What is it for a probability claim to be true? Given two
claims about a coin in my pocket:
H1: the coin is fair (probability of heads = .5)
H2: the coin is loaded 75% toward heads (probability of heads = .75)

What is it for H1 to be true but H2 false? Unfortunately, neither
hypothesis puts any binding constraints on any experiment we
might conduct in the actual world. We might say that H1
implies that the proportion of heads in a very long sequence of
flips should converge to .5 as the sequence gets longer and
longer, but that this is not the case for H2. But the “should” in
this sentence is itself probabilistic. Any finite sequence of coin
flips is consistent with both of these hypotheses. Perhaps this
is just philosophical obstructionism. Even though we don’t yet
possess an entirely satisfactory account of what it means for H1
to be true and H2 false in the actual world, several accounts are
out there.9 We don’t want to put the legal system on hold until
the philosophers can agree on a semantics for probability.
To summarize, provided we can be sufficiently precise
about the manipulations (interventions) that will transport us
from the actual to a counterfactual possible world, and
provided probability claims have a coherent semantics, then
general causal claims have a truth value as well. At minimum,
their truth depends on the probability of the effect in two
populations.
C.

Individual Causal Claims and Truth

Now consider whether individual causal claims have a
determinate truth value. Was John Smith’s liver cancer caused
by his exposure to TCE? Was Jane Doe’s illness cured by the
experimental drug she took? Again, these claims depend upon
8

Presuming there is such a thing!
See Interpretations of Probability, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. July 7, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/.
9
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evaluating counterfactuals. What happens to John Smith in
the world in which he wasn’t exposed to TCE? What happens
to Jane Doe in the world in which she takes the placebo
pill? Having argued that these counterfactual worlds are not
necessarily insurmountably vague, let us now consider whether
these questions have definite answers.
Again, the answer depends on probability, but in a
completely different sense than we have already discussed. It
depends upon whether the world is deterministic, as we are
psychologically built to expect, or indeterministic, as the
physicists tell us it is.
Roughly, in a deterministic world, the past fully determines the future. What happens to Jane Doe after she takes
the pill is not a lottery, but a sure thing. We might not know
enough about the details to be able to predict what will happen,
but that is an epistemic limitation and not a feature of the
world we inhabit. In an indeterministic world (still guided by
physical laws), the past does not determine the future, but at
most determines the probabilities of possible futures.
Although Einstein detested the thought of an indeterministic world and said so (“[God] does not play dice”10), in
modern physics God is indeed a gambler. When a single
electron is shot at a screen that records the point where it
“hits,” all that can be predicted about its landing site is its
probability. The probabilities can be predicted perfectly, and
experiments using thousands of electrons have confirmed the
accuracy of these probabilistic predictions, but the exact
position on a single trial cannot be predicted perfectly, no
matter what we know about the electron. Even if we learned
everything there was to know about the electron midway
through its flight, and the universe within which it traveled, it
would not be enough to determine where it will hit the screen.
We are simply not evolved to accept this idea fully, but this is
the way the world seems to be.
Translated back to Jane Doe, if the world is truly
indeterministic, then although she took the treatment pill and
recovered in the actual world, there is no fact to the matter
about what would have happened to her if she had taken the
control pill. And it has nothing to do with the vagueness of the
counterfactual.
10
Albert Einstein, Letter to Max Born, Dec. 4, 1926, in LEWIS S. FEUER,
EINSTEIN AND THE GENERATIONS OF SCIENCE 80 (2d ed. 1982).
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If the world is truly indeterministic, then even if we
could go back in time and replay the world millions of times
from the exact spot we like, for example, leaving everything the
same but changing the contents of Jane’s pill, the outcome on
each play is still truly a lottery. Analogous to the electron’s
landing site on the screen, the probabilities for Jane’s outcome
might be determined and perhaps knowable, but the outcome
on each play is not. Thus, if one uses the basic legal test for
causation, that is, the but-for test, then individual level causal
claims simply do not have a truth value in a world in which
God actually does play dice.
If the world is deterministic, then probability statements capture only our epistemic uncertainty, not something
more fundamental about the world. For example, suppose that
a population exposed to TCE has a probability of getting liver
cancer of .02. It might be the case that some people in the
population have an unusual genetic makeup such that, if they
are exposed to TCE they will definitely get liver cancer, but if
they are not exposed they definitely will not get cancer, and
that 2% of this population has the unlucky gene. In 1960,
before we could sequence an individual’s genes, we would not
be able to tell which of the individuals were lucky or unlucky.
Thus, for any individual J, chosen at random, J’s fate is
determined, but our epistemic access to it is limited to the true
claim: “J was exposed to TCE and thus the probability that
he will get liver cancer is 2%.” The underlying situation is
deterministic, but due to our limited access appears indeterministic. Philosophers refer to such a world as pseudoindeterministic.11
In a pseudo-indeterministic world, individual level
causal claims do have a truth value. Although we might not
have access to his genome, individual J either has the unlucky
gene or he doesn’t, and whichever it is determines his cancer
outcome. If individual J got liver cancer, and he had the
unlucky gene, then the claim that J would not have gotten liver
cancer but for the TCE exposure is true, even though we cannot
know it until we can sequence his genome or find some other
marker that correlates perfectly with the unlucky gene.
So which world are we in? Electrons may be truly
indeterministic, but is cancer? Even if a gene exists which
makes an individual vulnerable to TCE exposure, cancer
11

See SPIRTES ET AL., supra note 7, at 19-29.
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Gene L
10%
Gene V
10%
Population

Figure 1 Pseudo-indeterministic population.

requires a complicated series of genetic mutations and other
developments, all of which can happen in a number of different
ways, including insult from TCE, cosmic rays, a failure of the
DNA repair mechanisms, etc. Perhaps quantum mechanical
indeterminism does play a role in TCE exposure. Perhaps TCE
interacts with some molecule in codon 61 of the H-ras
protooncogene,12 the result being to move the probability of
mutation in this gene slightly higher but leaving us with
nothing, even in principle, that we could measure or observe
about an individual of whom we could say that but for TCE,
they would not have gotten liver cancer. I don’t know, and right
now I think it is safe to say that no one else does either.
If the question of whether individual level causal claims
have a truth value depends on whether the world is pseudoindeterministic or truly indeterministic, this is not so for
general causal claims.
General causal claims involve the probability of the
effect in a population that was exposed to the cause and the
probability of the effect in the same population not exposed to
the cause. These probability claims have a truth value
regardless if the world is pseudo-indeterministic or truly
indeterministic. Consider again the probability of liver cancer
and TCE exposure, and suppose our general claim is that the
probability of liver cancer is .02 if you are exposed to TCE, and
.01 if not. In the pseudo-indeterministic world depicted in
Figure 1, 10% of the population has an unlucky gene (gene L)
that produces liver cancer always, and another, separate 10%
12

This is the suspected loci of TCE’s effect on mice in tumorigenesis studies.
Richard J. Bull, Mode of Action of Liver Tumor Induction by Trichloroethylene and Its
Metabolites, Trichloroacetate and Dichloroacetate. 108 (Supp. 2) ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
241, 254 (2000), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=
1637759&blobtype=pdf.
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of the population has a vulnerability gene (gene V) that gives
you liver cancer whenever you are exposed to TCE (and fails to
prevent the first gene from giving you cancer when you are not
exposed to TCE).
Likewise, we can imagine a truly indeterministic world
in which everyone’s propensity for getting liver cancer is moved
from 10% to 20% with TCE exposure, but that there is nothing
hidden to be discovered that will determine the outcome.
D.

The Primacy of General Causal Claims

So individual causal claims have a truth value in a
pseudo-indeterministic world, but upon what does their truth
depend? Essentially, it depends on answering a counterfactual
question of the form: would the ‘effect’ have failed to occur ‘but
for’ the cause? Ignoring the many difficulties with this simple
account of actual causation (such as overdetermination13 or preemption14), consider again what is required to evaluate such
counterfactual claims. Consider two claims: (1) John Smith
would not have gotten liver cancer but for exposure to TCE and
(2) John Smith would not have gotten liver cancer but for
wearing brown socks to work on Mondays. We must be able to
assess whether John Smith’s life would have produced liver
cancer in each of the two counterfactual worlds: (1) the world in
which he lives his life exactly as before but is not exposed to
TCE and (2) the world in which he lives his life exactly as
before but does not wear brown socks to work on Mondays.
Assessing whether he gets liver cancer in these worlds requires
the general causal knowledge about how the world would have
responded to such changes.
Once we decide, in our counterfactual world, exactly
how to change John Smith’s circumstances, then the question
of whether or not he gets liver cancer in this alternative world
depends entirely on the causal laws we take to hold in all the
possible worlds we consider. Given that the shift from wearing
brown socks to black socks on Mondays is sufficiently minimal,
13
For example, when several soldiers in a firing squad shoot real bullets
accurately, the prisoner’s death is overdetermined. For any individual soldier, it is false
to say that the prisoner would not have died but for the soldier. We want each soldier
to come out as a cause.
14
For example, when spy 1 pokes a hole in the canteen of an enemy about to
cross a desert, he pre-empts the effect of spy 2, who had previously filled the canteen
with poison. It is false to say that the enemy would not have died, but for either spy.
We want spy 1 to be the cause and not spy 2.
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then Smith still gets cancer because of the general causal
claim: sock color has no causal influence on liver cancer.
Halpern and Pearl,15 Woodward,16 and others who have
articulated clear accounts of individual level causal claims
all require as input: (1) what happened in the real world,
(2) precision about how the counterfactual world is to differ
from the actual world as a result of removing or adding the
“cause,” and (3) the general causal laws (usually called the
structural equations) relevant to the events discussed. The
moral is clear: we cannot assess the truth of individual level
causal claims until we have the general causal laws relevant to
the events at issue.
E.

The Probability of Causation

If we know the general causal claims, that is, the risks
of those exposed and of those not exposed, then we can turn to
a weaker notion than truth for assessing our individual but-for
causal claims. We can compute what is called the probability of
causation (“PC”), a number that roughly corresponds to the
probability that someone exposed would have avoided the
disease had they not been exposed.17 The PC is based on what is
called the attributable fraction of risk in a population (AF):
AF =

=

Risk(expos ed) − Risk(unexp osed)
Risk(expos ed)
P(disease| exposed) − P(disease| unexposed)
P(disease| exposed)

For example, if the risk of liver cancer among TCE
exposed workers is 2%, and would have been 1% had they not
been exposed, then the AF = .5, so half of the liver cancers
15
Joseph Y. Halpern & Judea Pearl, Causes and Explanations: A StructuralModel Approach. Part I: Causes, 56 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 843, 843-87 (2005).
16
JAMES WOODWARD, MAKING THINGS HAPPEN: A THEORY OF CAUSAL
EXPLANATION 3-24 (2003).
17
COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE
PRESUMPTIVE DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR VETERANS 7-5 to -6
(Jonathan M. Samet & Catherine C. Bodurow eds., Nat’l Academies Press 2007)
[hereinafter DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING]; Sander Greenland & James M. Robins,
Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 321, 321-22
(2000).
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observed in TCE exposed workers can be assumed to be the
result of TCE exposure.
In many cases we have data on widely defined
populations, for example, factory workers in Ohio, but no data
on subpopulations, for example, workers 40 to 45 years in age,
or workers who have a close ancestor with liver cancer, etc. In
such cases it is typical to use the AF from the most narrowly
defined and most informative population possible. For example,
the risks for the Ohio factory workers might be 2% for exposed
and 1% for unexposed, but among 40- to 45-year-old workers
with a history of liver cancer in their family, the risks might be
6% for exposed and 5% for unexposed, making the AF = .06 –
.05/.06 = 16.67%. So if Robert Jones is a non-descript Ohio
factory worker who was exposed to TCE and got liver cancer,
then the probability that his liver cancer was caused by TCE
was 50%, but if Tim Lewis is a 43-year-old factory worker
exposed to TCE with a father who had liver cancer, then the
probability that his liver cancer was caused by TCE was much
lower: 16.7%.
As to truth, the probability of causation is no help at all.
Just as it is not true to say that a given coin flip came out
heads because the coin was loaded 75% heads, it is not true to
say that a given individual’s cancer was caused by TCE
exposure because the probability of causation was 75%. A high
probability of causation,18 or something like it, might be what
the law must resort to in deciding torts and similar issues, but
it should not be confused with assenting to the truth of a butfor claim.
III.

EVIDENCE FOR GENERAL CAUSAL CLAIMS

So the truth or probability of an individual causal claim
depends upon the general causal laws. It is to the problem of
deciding on the general causal laws that I now turn. As I have
already stressed, assessing general causal claims requires comparing a real population (e.g., Actual Population 1, Figure 2)

18

PC is objectionable for several reasons, not just that it falls short of truth.
Sander Greenland and Jamie Robins have argued that a better measure of the
plaintiff’s injury is an estimate of the years of life lost (“YLL”). Since YLL is also either
something that might be determined by exposure, or only have its probability
determined by exposure, I have no stake in this debate: all the issues regarding the
truth of individual causal claims apply to YLL and PC equally. See Greenland &
Robins, supra note 17, at 346.
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Association

Actual Population 1:
TCE Exposure Observed

Actual Population 2:
No TCE Exposure Observed

P(Cancer | TCE)

P(Cancer | no TCE)

Causation

Counterfactual Population 1:
Set to no TCE
P(Cancer | Set to no TCE)

Figure 2 Association versus causation.19

with a counterfactual one (e.g., Counterfactual Population 1,
Figure 2). Clearly we cannot go back in time and remove TCE
or change the commercials children were exposed to. Can we
compare workers exposed to TCE to other workers not exposed
to TCE? Yes, but comparing an exposed population (Actual
Population 1, Figure 2) to another population that we observe
not to be exposed (Actual Population 2, Figure 2) reveals
association, but not necessarily causation.
This is because an actual population of workers not
exposed to TCE (Actual Population 2, Figure 2) might differ
from the workers exposed to TCE (Actual Population 1, Figure
2) in other ways that affect cancer, such as diet, income, etc.
For example, it is nearly certain that children five to
eight years of age who were in fact exposed to fewer than ten
junk food commercials per day had a lower frequency of obesity
in 2005 than children who were exposed to more than ten. But
because it is also nearly certain that this group of children
differs in other important ways from the population described
in the claim, for example, their parents are more educated,
wealthier, etc., this is not the appropriate contrast class for
causation. The appropriate contrast class is the same group of
19

The expression P(Cancer | TCE) denotes the probability of cancer among
those exposed to TCE. It also might be referred to as the conditional probability of
cancer, given exposure to TCE. The expression P(Cancer | Set to TCE) would denote
the probability of cancer among those upon whom we intervened to force exposure to
TCE.
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children, living the same life, but with the junk food commercials removed, or replaced with other sorts of commercials. In
the first case, we are comparing children we observed being
exposed to a lot of junk food commercials to children we
observed being exposed to few commercials, and this
comparison would undoubtedly reveal a statistical association
between junk food and obesity. In the second case, we are
comparing children we observed being exposed to a lot of junk
food commercials to the same children after a hypothetical
intervention in which we go back in time and change their
exposure to commercials from a lot to a little. It is this comparison that reveals the causal relationship, but which is, in
the deepest sense, unobservable.
As the population under a counterfactual, hypothetical
intervention cannot be observed, how are scientists to gather
evidence about this counterfactual population? This is the
problem of causal inference.
A.

Randomized Trials

Sir Ronald Fisher, the brilliant and prolific British statistician, provided in the 1930s what is still the gold standard
today for causal inference: the randomized trial (“RT”).20 In its
simplest form, an RT randomly splits a population into two
subgroups (which we can expect on average to be identical),
thus creating two versions of the same population, and then
exposes one subpopulation to the cause (the “treated” group)
and one to the absence of the cause (the “control” group). The
frequency of the effect in the two groups provides evidence of
the probability of the effect in the two populations we seek: one
in which the cause is present, and an identical copy in which
the cause is not present. Subtleties abound, but the basic
strategy is sound and taught in every introductory research
methods course.
The problem, of course, is that in a number of situations
performing an RT is either ethically or practically impossible.
We simply cannot intentionally expose half of a population to
TCE and look for liver cancer.
There are essentially two recourses to an RT: (1) we can
statistically adjust for naturally occurring differences in two
populations, or (2) we can perform very small versions of RTs
20
See RONALD A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS
(4th ed. 1932).
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on animals we don’t seem to mind harming, for example,
rodents.
B.

Epidemiological Studies

Epidemiological studies involve observing human
populations in which we do not control exposure to a cause and
thus must resort to recourse (b): that is, epidemiological studies
must statically adjust for naturally occurring differences in the
exposed and nonexposed populations before they can claim
evidence of causation. Statistical adjustment requires that we
know all the relevant features upon which individuals differ
besides being exposed to the cause or not. For example, a
subpopulation that is exposed to TCE, for example, automotive
factory workers who handle paint strippers that contain TCE,
and a subpopulation that is not exposed to TCE, for example,
workers on a chicken farm, may differ in more ways than just
TCE exposure. The chicken farm workers may be different in
age, have different diets, etc.
If we measure all the relevant differences, that is, those
that also might cause liver cancer, then we can often adjust for
these differences statistically and test for differences in liver
cancer rates among the groups after this adjustment. If we do
not know all the relevant differences, however, then this
strategy fails. For example, if, unbeknownst to us, the
autoworkers’ drinking water contains some other set of
chemicals that cause liver cancer, while the farm workers’
water does not, and we don’t adjust for this, then our inference
will be unsound.
A raft of other methodological issues confront epidemiologists, but the scientific evidence from such studies can in
some instances be compelling, for example, cigarette smoking
and lung cancer.
C.

Toxicological and Animal Studies

In many cases, animals like rats or mice or rabbits or
chimps share enough of human physiology to make it plausible
to extrapolate from experiments with animals to what would
happen in a similar experiment with humans. Biologists frequently perform controlled experiments on rodents to garner
evidence to show whether some chemical causes cancer. They
expose some rodents to a control, and others that are genetically identical and raised in the same environment to the
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chemical of interest, and then compare the frequency of
cancerous tumors. In some cases they can examine extremely
detailed mechanisms by which the chemical might lead to a
tumor by doing cell physiology on both the animals under study
and human cells.
There are a number of informative and accessible
discussions of the wide variety of evidence that can be used for
causal inference.21 Although in my view the topic deserves
dozens of books, it is out of my scope to say more here. In
summary, scientists have long recognized that there are at
least three distinct kinds of evidence that bear on the truth of
general causal claims:22

IV.

•

Interventional studies on humans (e.g., RTs)

•

Non-interventional (observational) studies on
humans (e.g., Epidemiological studies)

•

Mechanistic/toxicological evidence (e.g., animal and
cell studies)
COMBING THE EVIDENCE FOR CAUSATION

To come to a reasoned position on the status of a general
causal claim, especially in a legal setting, we must (1) combine
all the available evidence into a single judgment on whether
the claim is true and (2) express the degree of our uncertainty
about the claim.
In many cases, the evidence for a general causal claim is
mixed. On some questions, there are RTs that show that a drug
or treatment has a positive effect, others which show no effect,
and still others which show a negative effect.23 As they are
more complicated methodologically, epidemiological studies
often present mixed evidence for a general causal claim. In
many situations animal studies also show mixed results.
Rationally combining multiple pieces of similar evidence, for
21
See, e.g., DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING, supra note 17, at 7-2 to -5;
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT: THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING.
(2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_2004/index.htm; FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000),
available at http://www.rashkind.com/researchlinks.htm.
22
See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 20.
23
See, e.g., A.R. White et al., A Meta-Analysis of Acupuncture Techniques for
Smoking Cessation, 8 TOBACCO CONTROL 393, 393-97 (1999).
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example, multiple RTs, is difficult but often feasible. The real
challenge is to rationally combine different sources of scientific
evidence into a single judgment about the truth of a general
causal claim.
A.

Meta-Analysis

For many general causal claims, for example, hormone
therapy and breast cancer, there are often several distinct RTs
in the published literature. Optimally combining the evidence
from such studies is a topic of its own, called meta-analysis. A
meta-analysis involves mathematically combining the results
from multiple but comparable RTs to derive a summary
estimate of the effect of some cause on some effect, often
involving health, that appropriately combines the results of all
the individual studies.24
The technique is not limited to combining RTs, but can
also be used to combine the evidence from several epidemiological (observational) studies, provided the populations studied
are comparable. If the populations vary, then a related
technique called meta-regression25 sometimes allows pooling
of data in a principled way. Recent work by Eloise Kaizar26
improves on meta-regression when data from both RTs and
observational studies are available on a similar general causal
claim.
Meta-analytic methods are in general quite useful when
there are multiple studies on the same causal claim. For
example, the 2006 Institute of Medicine Committee on
Asbestos did a quantitative meta-analysis on studies which
individually estimated the effect of asbestos exposure on any
of a number of different cancers, reporting a quantitative
estimate that is a combination of the estimates from the

24
See, e.g., Kay Dickersin & Jesse A. Berlin, Meta-Analysis: State-of-theScience, 14 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 154 (1992); P. Easterbrook & J. Berlin, Meta-Analysis,
341 LANCET 965 (1993); K.A. L’Abbe et al., Meta-Analysis in Clinical Research, 107
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 224 (1987).
25
See Sander Greenland, Can Meta-Analysis Be Salvaged?, 140 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 783 (1994); Sander Greenland & Keith O’Rourke, On the Bias Produced
by Quality Scores in Meta-Analysis, and a Hierarchical View of Proposed Solutions, 2
BIOSTATISTICS 463 (2001).
26
Eloise E. Kaizar, Combining Information from Diverse Sources (2006)
(Ph.D. Thesis, Dep’t of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon University); Eloise E. Kaizar,
MetaAnalyses Are Observational Studies: How Lack of Randomization Impacts
Analysis, 100 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 1233 (2005).
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individual studies, as well as measures expressing the
uncertainty of such estimates.27
No matter how sophisticated the meta-analytic technique, however, it is still limited to combining statistical
evidence from different human studies into a single statistical
estimate of the effect size, for example, the probability of
the effect in the population exposed to the cause and the
probability of the effect in the same population not exposed to
the cause.
Meta-analysis of any form, however, cannot incorporate
toxicological/mechanistic knowledge, nor can it easily factor
in the quality of the studies being combined into a single
estimate.
There is a technique, called the Bayesian approach,28 for
combining all available evidence, including a scientist’s background knowledge, judgment, etc., into a single judgment about
the nature and uncertainty of a general causal claim.
B.

The Bayesian Approach

Several forests have been sacrificed explicating and
debating the pros and cons of the Bayesian approach,29 so I will
try to avoid piling on and provide only the briefest of sketches.
There are many forms of the Bayesian approach, but the most
appealing, in my view, is the most extreme. In this view,
almost any statement—for example, “TCE causes liver cancer”
or “your next child will be born with blond hair” or “the moon
was formed by a collision between a proto-planet and the
Earth”—can be assigned a credence, or degree of belief between
0 and 1, and the degrees of belief can be interpreted as
probabilities. In some cases the probability can be assigned
objectively, for example, the objective probability of your next
child being born with blond hair, or any of a number of
heritable diseases, can be worked out by a genetics counselor
27
COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ASBESTOS: SELECTED
CANCERS 2 (Nat’l Academies Press 2006).
28
Named after the Reverend Thomas Bayes, who lived during the first half of
the eighteenth century.
29
For a sampler, see JAMES O. BERGER, STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY AND
BAYESIAN STATISTICS (2d ed. 1985); WILLIAM M. BOLSTAD, INTRODUCTION TO BAYESIAN
STATISTICS (2d ed. 2007); ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS (2d ed.
2004); COLIN HOWSON & PETER URBACH, SCIENTIFIC REASONING: THE BAYESIAN
APPROACH (1993); RICHARD E. NEAPOLITAN, LEARNING BAYESIAN NETWORKS (2004);
A.P. Dawid, Probability, Causality and the Empirical World: A Bayes-De DinettiPopper-Borel Synthesis, 19 STATISTICAL SCI. 44-57 (2004).
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with appropriate access to your family history and perhaps
some of your blood. In other cases the probability corresponds
to nothing more than a subjective degree of belief. For example,
having little or no evidence to go on, in 2007 I may assign a
probability of .2 to the statement, “Blu-Ray will win the format
wars over HD-DVD for the next generation of DVDs.”
The approach provides a principled way to compute the
probability one should assign to a hypothesis H, after you have
seen a new piece of evidence E, notated as P(H|E).30 The
fundamental theorem which drives the approach is extremely
simple to state and prove:
P(H|E) =

P(E|H)P(H)
P(E)

The numerator on the right involves P(E|H), called the
likelihood since it represents the probability of the evidence E
given H is true, and P(H), called the prior, the probability
assigned to H prior to seeing the evidence. The denominator,
P(E), is the probability of the evidence without any consideration of the hypothesis H. The target, P(H|E), is called the
posterior as it reflects the probability of H after seeing the
evidence E.
A classic use of the formula is in computing the
probability of having a disease, given a diagnostic test result.
For example, suppose a 20-year-old upper middle class heterosexual male Jim gets a blood test for HIV, and it comes out
positive. Jim is scared, but what is the probability of H: that he
is actually infected with HIV, given the evidence from the blood
test E? First suppose that the test is 98% reliable. That is,
suppose that the probability of the test coming out positive
given HIV infection, P(E|H), is .98. Now Jim is truly terrified.
Next suppose that P(H), the prior probability of a 20-year-old
upper middle class heterosexual male having HIV, is 1 in 1000
(.001). Finally, suppose that P(E), the probability of a blood test
coming out positive is 1 in 125 (.008). Then, to Jim’s relief, the
posterior probability of HIV = .1225:
P ( H | E) =

30

P ( E| H ) = .98 * P ( H ) = .001
= .1225
P ( E) = .008

Also referred to as the probability of H conditional on E, or H given E.
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The apparent discrepancy between the 98% reliability of the
HIV test and posterior probability of HIV of 12.25% is due to
the low prior probability of HIV in Jim’s cohort, and the
frequency of positive blood tests. If one views the situation as a
Bayesian, however, the evidence did make a big difference.
Before taking the test, the probability of Jim having HIV was 1
in 1000. After the positive test, the probability moved to about
1 in 8, a huge jump.
The Bayesian approach has been used (and misused) in
assessing forensic evidence like DNA testing in courtrooms for
well over a decade.31
In our context, the potential utility of the approach
should be apparent. Beginning with some prior belief over a
general causal claim Hc, for example, that TCE causes liver
cancer, then for each new piece of evidence, in the form of an
RT, or epidemiological study, toxicological study, or what have
you, one can use the Bayesian approach to compute the
probability that Hc is true given this evidence. When all the
evidence is in, we emerge with a posterior probability of Hc,
that is, the probability of Hc given all the evidence available.
In practice, the Bayesian approach is far from a
panacea. In typical scientific contexts involving a community of
scientists, it is very difficult to move from inchoate and diverse
sorts of background knowledge to a prior, that is, a degree of
belief in the causal claim prior to reviewing the evidence.
Further, while “updating” to a posterior from certain kinds of
evidence is reasonably straightforward, updating from other
kinds of evidence is not. For example, consider computing the
probability of liver cancer as a function of TCE exposure. After
a few studies estimating the dependence of liver cancer risk on
TCE concentration in work environment air, we can use the
Bayesian approach to incorporate a new sample of 400 factory
workers who were exposed to air with varying amounts of TCE
concentrations for ten years, for example. As the probability of
liver cancer as a function of TCE exposure is the hypothesis
under study, the likelihood in Bayes’ formula is objective. That
is, the probability of seeing a particular frequency of liver
cancers given that TCE does cause liver cancer, is objectively,
mathematically derivable, and from that we can apply Bayes’
theorem.
31
See, e.g., Joseph B. Kadane, Misuse of Bayesian Statistics in Court,
CHANCE, Spring 2006, at 38.
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What we cannot do, at least in any objective way, is to
use the approach to update on evidence that shows rats
exposed to 50 ppb TCE get tumors at three times the rate of
those exposed to 1 ppb. What is the likelihood of this evidence,
assuming TCE does cause liver cancer in humans? Here we are
often beyond mathematics and statistics and into opinion about
the comparability of rats and humans.32 Other features of
studies, for example, the quality of measures employed in an
epidemiological survey, are also extremely hard to incorporate
in any objective way into a Bayesian analysis. In general, this
is referred to as the “objectivity of the likelihood” problem.
Besides the sheer difficulty in performing the appropriate
computations, the approach is a regulative ideal, but it is still
far from the practical device we want to get us to a rational
judgment on the truth of a general causal claim.
Finally, the probability of a hypothesis does not
correspond in any simple way to the chances of it being true in
the world. The justification for the technique is decisiontheoretic, and is based more on a theory of rationality than it is
on correspondence to the truth.33
This is not to say that the technique is hopeless. It isn’t.
An actual example of using it for assessing a general causal
claim relevant to the law comes from the National Academy of
Science’s (“NAS”) BEIR IV report, which sought to estimate the
carcinogenicity of plutonium in humans.34 By assuming that
the ratio of carcinogenic potencies of plutonium to various
other radionuclides like radium would be roughly constant
across species, the Committee managed to combine very
limited human data involving plutonium, with extensive
animal data on plutonium and radium, and more extensive
human data on radium, to emerge with a posterior over the
hypothesis concerning the carcinogenicity of plutonium in
humans.

32
This is not always the case. See William H. DuMouchel & Jeffrey E.
Harris, Bayes Methods for Combining the Results of Cancer Studies in Humans and
Other Species, 78 J. AM. STATISTICAL ASS’N 293 (1983).
33
For a recent philosophical discussion of the epistemological view of the
Bayesian approach, see LUC BOVENS & STEPHAN HARTMANN, BAYESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY
(2003).
34
COMMITTEE ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATIONS,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HEALTH RISKS OF RADON AND OTHER INTERNALLY
DEPOSITED ALPHA-EMITTERS: BEIR IV (Nat’l Academy Press 1988).
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Figure 3 Posteriors over inches of rain on Labor Day 2010.

Although I have been focusing on the problems of
combining different sorts of evidence and ignoring the issue of
expressing the uncertainty over causal claims, this comes for
free with the Bayesian approach. For simple propositions, like
R: “it will rain on Labor Day 2010 in Brooklyn,” the posterior
will be a probability between 0 and 1. If, in scientist A’s posterior R has a probability of .93, and in scientist B’s posterior R
has a probability of .55, then A is in some sense more certain
about R than B. Both scientists are more confident that R is
true than that R is false—so they both in some sense believe R
is true—but their degree of uncertainty is not the same. They
should both take an even bet on R, but A would give much
longer odds than B.
For more complicated hypotheses (for example, “it will
rain x inches on Labor Day 2010”), where we are asked to put a
probability over each possible value of x, then the posterior is
not a number but a probability distribution. For example,
scientist A might have a posterior like the left side of Figure 3,
while scientist B has a posterior like the right side of Figure 3.
Roughly, the height of the graph corresponds to how much
probability the scientist distributes over that number of inches
of rain. The rectangle over 0 represents the probability of no
rain (0 inches), which is .07 for Scientist A and .45 for Scientist
B, while the rest of the posterior is distributed over rain from
0-1.2 inches on that day. If it does rain, then Scientist A seems
to put the most probability over around .3 inches, while Scientist B, although he is less confident that it will rain, if it does,
he deems it most probable to rain a little over .4 inches.
We can do the same with causal claims regarding the
relative risk of liver cancer after 10 years of exposure to 10 ppb
TCE exposure compared to no TCE exposure. A relative risk of
1.0 means that TCE has no effect on liver cancer. A relative
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Figure 4 Posteriors over relative risk of liver cancer.

risk of 2.0 means that a person exposed to 10 ppb for 10 years
has twice the probability of getting liver cancer as someone
not exposed. In Figure 4, Scientist A believes that overall there
is an effect of TCE, but it is relatively small, that is, a relative
risk of around 1.3. Although her assessment of the size of the
effect is small, she is quite confident that the relative risk is
close to 1.3 as her posterior is narrowly distributed around 1.3.
Scientist B seems to put the most probability around a larger
effect, a relative risk of 2.0, but as her posterior is much wider
and more diffuse, she is more uncertain about the size of the
causal effect than is Scientist A.
So the Bayesian approach, although imperfect in many
ways and practically always a challenge to apply, provides one
way to synthesize the evidence and to express uncertainty
about general causal claims that might be appealing to the law.
V.

WHAT’S THE LAW TO DO?

The final question to tackle is the hardest: what’s the
law to do? Currently, the courts deal with complicated matters
of causation in something like the following way. The judge
must act as gatekeeper and decide which experts will be
allowed to testify as to the scientific case for or against the
general causal claim.35 The plaintiffs then mount a case by
summoning the experts (whom the judge allowed) to argue to
the jury that the scientific evidence for the general and the
individual causal claim is compelling. The defense then
summons their own experts, who argue that the scientific
35
This is true since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 592-93 (1993).
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evidence is not compelling, sometimes by impeaching the
credibility of the plaintiff’s experts, sometimes by emphasizing
alternative evidence, etc.
Neither the judge nor the jury is trained to synthesize a
diverse body of complicated scientific evidence, especially evidence presented by highly partial, highly sophistical experts. A
better system would have the community of scientists—who
are presumably both less invested in the outcome and more
qualified to rationally assess a wide body of complicated
evidence—come to consensus as to the truth of the general
causal claims at issue as well as the scientific uncertainty
around these claims. This output from the scientific community
could then be used as input to the legal system. This would not
preclude plaintiffs or defendants from mounting their own
experts and cases, but it would give the judge and jury a
perspective on the science to fall back to when they are
overwhelmed by the briefs submitted or the pyrotechnics in the
courtroom.
Such a system is in fact already in place and used
widely. For example, in decisions as to whether to compensate
Vietnam veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange and now
have some illness (like liver cancer), the Veteran’s Administration does not restrict itself to hearings involving experts from
both sides; rather, it consults a bi-annual report on the general
causal claims true of Agent Orange exposure produced by a
distinguished panel of independent scientists retained by the
Institute of Medicine, a branch of the National Academies of
Science.36
The International Agency for Research on Cancer
(“IARC”),37 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,38 the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,39 the National
Institutes of Health,40 and the National Toxicology Program41

36
See COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE HEALTH EFFECTS IN VIETNAM VETERANS
EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, VETERANS AND AGENT ORANGE:
UPDATE 2004 (Nat’l Academies Press 2005).
37
INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, IARC MONOGRAPHS
ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS, Preamble (W.H.O. 2006),
available at http://monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Preamble/CurrentPreamble.pdf.
38
RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, U.S. EPA, EPA/630/P-03/001F, GUIDELINES FOR
CARCINOGEN RISK ASSESSMENT (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/iris/
cancero32505.php.
39
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 21.
40
National Institutes of Health, News Release, Fact Sheet: The “Report on
Carcinogens” 9th Edition, http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/may2000/niehs-15.htm.
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other relevant data
•

•

Mechanistic data
“weak,” “moderate,” or
“strong”?
Mechanism likely to be
operative in humans?
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Group 2B
Group 3
Group 4

Carcinogenic to humans
Probably carcinogenic to humans
Possibly carcinogenic to humans
Not classifiable as to its carcinogenicity to humans
Probably not carcinogenic to humans

Figure 5 IARC categorization scheme.

have all developed systems for retaining panels of scientists to
assess the status of general causal claims and to classify the
level of evidence in support of such claims, particularly where
such claims regard chemicals and cancer.
These panels rarely do a full Bayesian analysis to
synthesize all the evidence, although as I illustrated with the
NAS’s BEIR IV report, it is not unknown. Almost universally,
however, they assign the causal claim to one of four or five
discrete categories which differ on the truth of the claim and on
the scientific uncertainty surrounding the claim.42
For example, IARC forms committees consisting of
biologists, epidemiologists, and toxicologists. They instruct
these scientists to first categorize the level of evidence within
three subcategories—human, animal, and mechanistic—and
then to synthesize the subcategories of evidence into an overall
evaluation on a five-category scale ranging from carcinogenic to
probably not carcinogenic.43 Figure 5 depicts the IARC scheme.
Each of the categories has natural counterparts to a
Bayesian posterior, as explicitly described in the Institute of
Medicine’s 2007 report, “Improving the Presumptive Disability
41
NATIONAL TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM (NTP), 11TH REPORT ON CARCINOGENS
(U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. 2005).
42
They of course accompany this categorization with a long and inaccessible
report.
43
See IARC MONONGRAPHS, supra note 37, at 22-23.
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Decision-Making Process.”44 This sort of categorical output is
accessible and comprehensible to a judge and to a jury, and the
steps to reach a consensus on the output are much better
handled by relatively impartial scientists than by jurors trying
to weigh evidence described to them by highly partial and wellpaid experts.
The output of these panels regards the general causal
claims that must be invoked in a legal case in which an
individual causal claim is at stake, but the court must still
decide the individual causal claim. In calculating the
probability of causation or the years of life lost, for example,
the plaintiff must appeal to the general causal laws connecting
the purported exposure and the injury it allegedly caused, but
the court must still decide whether the estimate of PC of YLL
is high enough, even allowing for uncertainty in this estimate,
to warrant liability. This seems like more than enough complexity for juries to be asked to handle.

44

DISABILITY DECISION-MAKING, supra note 17.

